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Abstract Grounding our work on the resource-based
view of the firm, we study and quantify the impact of
non-financial resources added by venture capital (VC)
on the growth performance of investee companies.
While most of the literature compares VC-backed com-
panies with similar companies that did not receive ex-
ternal financing, our originality stems from the use of a
counterfactual of companies that received external
quasi-equity financing (in the form of participative
loans) but not non-financial resources. We use a
difference-in-difference (DD) estimator to disentangle
the effect of an injection of financial resources (which
can be used by companies to acquire non-financial
resources) from the contribution of the unique non-
financial resources brought in by VC (which companies
cannot otherwise acquire). Our results are based on a
large sample of young Spanish SMEs that received
either VC (915) or participative loans (1551) between
2005 and 2013 as first type of financing. We find that
the contribution of the non-financial resources leads to
yearly increases of 12.86% in employment, 38.13% in
total assets, and 54.03% in sales. Furthermore, we find
that only the most experienced VC firms contribute with
valuable non-financial resources.
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1 Introduction
There is overwhelming evidence that entrepreneurial
ventures (hereafter, EVs)1 receiving venture capital
(hereafter, VC) perform better than non-VC-backed
EVs across many dimensions, including employment
and sales growth (e.g., Bertoni et al. 2011; Engel and
Keilbach 2007). The higher performance of VC-backed
companies is attributed to the effect of three different
factors: (i) the detailed screening process performed by
VC firms (hereafter, VCs), which ensures that VC-
backed companies have higher potential with respect
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1 We define EVs as recently established SMEs (for a similar approach,
see Stuart et al. 1999).
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to other ventures (Amit et al. 1998; Chan 1983); (ii) the
funding provided (i.e., financial resources), which al-
lows financially constrained companies to undertake
investment opportunities that they would otherwise for-
go (Bertoni et al. 2010, 2013); and (iii) a complex
bundle of services, such as professionalization, network-
ing, and signaling, which are not present in other forms
of external finance (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Kaplan
and Strömberg 2004; Lerner 1995; Sapienza et al.
1996). In this work, we focus on this third contribution
of VC, which we refer to as the ability to add “non-
financial resources”; in the literature, this ability is often
called the VC “non-financial value added.”
Many efforts have been made by scholars (e.g.,
Baum and Silverman 2004; Chemmanur et al. 2011) to
understand to what extent the better performance of VC-
backed EVs is due to screening (i.e., VCs are better able
to pick winners) or to the direct effect of VC involve-
ment (i.e., the joint effect of financial and non-financial
resources provided to portfolio companies). The ability
of VCs to add non-financial resources is also largely
documented in the literature (e.g., see Large and
Muegge 2008). For instance, Sørensen (2007) finds that
more experienced VCs not only select better companies,
but also have a stronger “influence” on EVs’ probability
to go public. Chemmanur et al. (2011) highlight the
efficiency gains of the monitoring from a VCs. Bern-
stein et al. (2016) show that when VCs can visit their
target companies more easily due to the introduction of a
new airplane connection, the target’s performance im-
proves. Hsu (2004) proves that entrepreneurs are willing
to pay more for equity to partner with a reputed VCs,
possibly because they provide valuable non-financial
resources.
Most of these contributions are related to the US VC
market, which is way ahead the development of VC
markets elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, as
highlighted by Proksch et al. (2017), value-adding ac-
tivities are complex and highly diverse, and therefore
depend on the context. In Europe, the evidence on the
existence of non-financial value of VC is limited. Croce
et al. (2013) analyze the effect of the non-financial
resources added by European VCs on company perfor-
mance by resorting to total factor productivity. They
claim it is solely influenced by non-financial resources
because the financial injection is accounted for by the
increase in the inputs (capital and labor). However, total
factor productivity could be an imperfect measure to
isolate the non-financial resources added by VCs. We
argue that the financial resources injected could also be
used by EVs to improve their efficiency not only by
increasing the inputs, but also by upgrading their quality
(i.e., acquiring better technologies or hiring better engi-
neers and managers). Additionally, existing literature
demonstrates the existence of non-financial resources
added by VC, without directly quantifying their impact
on the investment performance.
As non-financial resources are specific of VC invest-
ments, and not present in some alternative financial
instruments (e.g., loans, or even crowdfunding), under-
standing to what extent the higher performance of VC-
backed EVs is beyond the pure injection of money can
be informative for both entrepreneurs seeking support
and policy makers interested in spurring growth. Hence,
the extent to which the non-financial resources provided
by VCs contribute to the higher performance of VC-
backed EVs is an important research question, especial-
ly outside the US. We aim to contribute to this topic by
proposing an empirical approach to isolate the impact of
non-financial resources from that of financial resources
added by VCs on the growth of portfolio companies.
Specifically, we adopt a classic difference-in-difference
(DD) methodology. However, in contrast to the com-
mon approach of comparing the performance of VC-
backed companies with that of companies that did not
receive any external financing (e.g., Engel and Keilbach
2007), we use as counterfactual EVs that received ex-
ternal financial resources but did not receive any addi-
tional non-financial resources. Our approach to quantify
non-financial value added is based on new ways to
finance entrepreneurial ventures that are emerging at
the crossroads between private and public equity
(Colombo et al. 2016). We focus on the case of partic-
ipative loans (hereafter, PLs), which are hybrid instru-
ments used by governmental agencies to finance EVs as
an alternative to government-backed VC and R&D
grants. Similar to VC, PLs are a form of long-term
quasi-equity finance awarded after a detailed screening
process. Despite the differences in the respective con-
tracts, VC and PLs share some similarities (e.g., selec-
tion, type of security, holding periods, and liquidation
rights). Our key assumption is that they bring qualita-
tively similar financial resources to target companies.
However, unlike VC, the public institution granting PLs
does not provide any non-financial resources.
Grounding our theory on the resource-based view of
the firm (Barney 1991), we expect VC to have a stronger
effect than PLs on the performance of EVs because of
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VC’s ability to add social and human capital, which are
non-financial resources fundamental to building
sustained competitive advantage for EVs (Ireland et al.
2003). We also argue that different types of VCs may
have different abilities to improve social and human
capital in portfolio EVs, depending on their own re-
source endowments and investment strategies. Specifi-
cally, we focus on the experience and portfolio manage-
ment strategy of VCs as possible drivers of their ability
to add non-financial resources. We test our hypotheses
on a representative sample of Spanish EVs receiving VC
and PLs between 2005 and 2013. We compare the
impact of PLs and (different types of) VCs on growth
using a DD estimator.
The main contribution of our work is the introduction
of a new approach to measure the magnitude of the
effect of the non-financial resources added by VCs by
directly and explicitly disentangling it from the impact
of financial resources. In addition, we provide theoreti-
cal grounding and empirical evidence on which charac-
teristics of VCs drive their ability to add non-financial
resources to portfolio EVs.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Sect. 2,
we present the theoretical background and develop our
hypotheses. In Sect. 3, we present the data and describe
the DDmethodology used. We show our main results in
Sect. 4, which also includes further robustness checks,
primarily aimed at addressing the potential bias arising
from differences in the selection criteria of VCs and
PLs. Finally, in Sect. 5, we discuss our findings and
conclude.
2 Theoretical background and hypothesis
development
According to the resource-based view, a firm must
have a bundle of valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable
and non-substitutable resources to build sustained
competitive advantage (Barney 1991; Penrose
1959; Wernerfelt 1984). The entrepreneurship liter-
ature shows that the human and social resources of
the entrepreneurs are the most important sources of
competitive advantage for EVs (Davidsson and
Honig 2003). However, sometimes, the internal en-
dowment of human and social resources in the en-
trepreneurial team is limited. Many EVs are created
by individuals with sophisticated technical skills but
scant managerial, commercial, and social skills
(Colombo and Grilli 2005). In these cases, EVs have
to invest in their human and social capital to sustain
their competitive advantage (Bosma et al. 2004), and
financial resources become fundamental to acquir-
ing key external non-financial resources (Ireland
et al. 2003).
However, as explained by agency theory, the ac-
cess of EVs to financial resources is extremely diffi-
cult. EVs are especially affected by information
asymmetries because of a lack of track records and
the often technology-intensive nature of their activi-
ties (Carpenter and Petersen 2002a). The lack of
tangible assets to be pledged as collateral further
worsens their credibility as potential borrowers. As
a result, EVs face severe adverse selection and moral
hazard problems in raising external capital to finance
their investment projects (Berger and Udell 1998;
Binks et al. 1992; Carpenter and Petersen 2002b).
Many EVs resort exclusively to internal finance and
are unable to access valuable external resources, in-
cluding human and social capital, which could be
crucial for developing and sustaining their competi-
tive advantage. In fact, financially constrained EVs
undertake fewer investments and achieve lower
growth than those that are not financially constrained
(Carpenter and Petersen 2002b).
2.1 Provision of financial resources by VCs and PLs
to EVs
VCs are prominent providers of financial resources to
EVs (Hellman and Puri 2000; Kortum and Lerner
2000). These financial intermediaries are able to reduce
the problems associated with information asymmetries
ex ante, due to a detailed screening process (Amit et al.
1998; Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Tyebjee and Bruno
1984), and ex post, by designing contracts to incentivize
portfolio company managers (Admati and Pfleiderer
1994) and by developing monitoring mechanisms in
portfolio firms (Fiet et al. 1997; Lerner 1995; Mitchell
et al. 1997). By injecting financial resources into port-
folio EVs, VCs relax their financial constraints, as doc-
umented by a reduction in their investment-cash flow
sensitivity (Bertoni et al. 2011, 2013; Engel and Stiebale
2014). EVs can use financial resources to acquire im-
portant tangible (e.g., plant and equipment) and intan-
gible (e.g., human and social capital) resources to build
sustained competitive advantage (Ireland et al. 2003).
This use of financial resources can at least partially
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explain the higher growth rates reported for VC-backed
companies with respect to other EVs (Colombo and
Grilli 2010; Davila et al. 2003; Engel and Keilbach
2007).2
Since VC is only accessible for a limited number of
EVs (Sahlman 1990), the “funding gap” is sometimes
bridged by policy schemes developed by governmental
agencies. Among the different instruments used, including
R&D, investment subsidies, subsidized loans, loan guar-
antees, and government-backed VC, new ways to finance
entrepreneurial ventures are emerging at the crossroads
between private and public equity (Colombo et al. 2016).
In particular, we highlight the emergence of hybrid instru-
ments that share the characteristics of both equity and
loans: PLs. Similar to regular loans, PLs have
predetermined maturity (similar to the average holding
period of VC investments) and interest payments. The
latter are divided into two components. The first compo-
nent is independent of the company’s performance and is
usually determined by the reference interest rate (e.g.,
Euribor) plus a spread. The second component is perfor-
mance-contingent, as it is based on the company’s net
profits in the relevant year (similar to a dividend). There
is usually a grace period in which the company does not
reimburse the loan, thus making the cash flow pattern of
this instrument similar to that of equity. In addition, PLs
are subordinated to any other loan and are computed as
equity for the purpose of financial analysis.
As in the case of VC, the institutions granting PLs
manage ex ante information asymmetries via a process of
careful selection. To be eligible for obtaining a PL, ap-
plicants must go through a rigorous screening process
that assesses the viability and innovativeness of the busi-
ness plan and the professionalization of the management
team. Since the institution granting the PLs receives a
large number of applications related to various emerging
and established technologies, officials can gain sizeable
insight into which companies are most promising and use
this knowledge to overcome information problems
(Lerner 2002). PL contracts further manage information
asymmetries by aligning the interests of the granting
agencies with those of the entrepreneurial companies by
sometimes requiring the beneficiary company to com-
plete a simultaneous capital increase.
There are similarities between VC and PLs also
regarding the characteristics of the instruments used.
First, VC and PLs share hybrid debt/equity attributes.
In fact, VCs seldom rely on pure equity when investing
in startups but rather prefer to use a mix of preferred
equity, straight debt, convertible debt, and convertible
equity (Cumming 2005). Similarly, PLs are hybrid debt-
equity contracts in which the interest payments have a
performance-contingent component. Both VCs and PLs
are senior to straight equity in the case of liquidation and
are both usually allocated by rating agencies in the
equity basket. Second, VC and PLs are comparable in
terms of duration (between 4 and 9 years). Additionally,
VC-backed and PL-backed EVs share common charac-
teristics: they both actively look for external financing
and are both selected by external investors after a careful
screening of their potential.
Therefore, similar to VC, PLs represent an injection
of long-term finance into selected promising EVs that
are financially constrained. In addition, beneficiary
firms are also able to increase long-term funding from
banks because of the PL certification effect (Martí and
Quas 2018). Hence, the receipt of PLs should relax
financial constraints (Carpenter and Petersen 2002b),
thus allowing EVs to have access to the external social
and human capital resources required to build
competitive advantage. Supporting this idea, Bertoni
et al. (2019) show that PLs significantly boosted the
growth in the number of employees of beneficiaries in a
sample of Spanish companies. As a result, we expect
that EVs receiving either VC or PLs will experience
significant growth after the injection of financial
resources.
2.2 Provision of non-financial resources by VCs to EVs
Even though PLs are comparable with VCs as providers
of external long-term financial resources, VC and PL
contracts are not similar across all dimensions. VC
contracts include strict monitoring and other post-
investment provisions (e.g., presence in the board, qual-
ified majorities for strategic decisions, among others)
and provide valuable non-financial resources to portfo-
lio companies (Busenitz 2007; Large andMuegge 2008;
Luukkonen et al. 2013; Proksch et al. 2017). VCs can
boost the human capital of EVs by performing a
“coach ing” func t ion , p rov id ing f inanc i a l ,
2 In this regard, despite the reluctance of Ray et al. (2004) about the use
of aggregate variables (i.e., performance measures) as a proxy for
sustained competitive advantage, we agree with Wernerfelt (1984) that
we could resort to such variables when we compare companies receiv-
ing and not receiving those valuable resources, especially when several
performance measures are jointly used to represent competitive
advantage.
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administrative, marketing, strategy, and management
advice (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Lerner 1995;
Sahlman 1990; Sapienza 1992; Sørensen 2007), and a
“professionalization” function, introducing human re-
source policies (e.g., stock option plans) and hiring
external managers (Bottazzi et al. 2008; Hellmann and
Puri 2002). Moreover, VCs boost the social capital of
EVs by granting them access to their networks
(Hochberg et al. 2007), by encouraging the establish-
ment of alliances (Colombo et al. 2006; Hsu 2006;
Lindsey 2008), and by endorsing portfolio firms to third
parties (Stuart et al. 1999). These functions facilitate
access to external resources such as potential new cus-
tomers, alliance partners, skilled workers, professional
services, banks, and other financial intermediaries. In
brief, VCs directly help EVs attract and build both
human and social capital.
In contrast, the post-investment clauses in PL con-
tracts focus on collection of the pre-determined and
contingent interest payments and on the repayment
schedule. The institution granting PLs does not monitor
the way in which the awarded companies are managed
and, therefore, does not directly improve the human and
social capital of beneficiary companies.
Since the differences between VC and PLs are mostly
related to the post-investment relationship with the ben-
eficiary EV, PLs represent an appropriate counterfactual
for measuring the effect of the non-financial resources
provided by VCs to their portfolio companies on their
competitive advantage. Resorting to several growth
measures to quantify gains in competitive advantage
(for similar approaches, see, e.g., Colombo and Grilli
2005), we argue that the superior growth of VC-backed
EVs, when compared with that of PL-backed EVs,
should be related to the extra valuable, rare, imperfectly
imitable and non-substitutable human and social capital
(i.e., non-financial resources) received. We thus outline
our first hypothesis as follows:
& Hypothesis 1. VC-backed EVs grow significantly
more than PL-backed EVs.
2.3 Drivers of VC investors’ provision of non-financial
resources to EVs
Previous research suggests that there is high heteroge-
neity across VCs (for a review, see Da Rin et al. 2013)
and that VCs’ ability to add human and social resources
to their portfolio EVs may be influenced by VC charac-
teristics. For instance, experience, reputation, partners’
human capital, and the number of companies in their
portfolio are key drivers of VCs’ ability to add value
(Drover et al. 2017). We do not pretend to theorize on
the human or social capital of VC investment managers.
Instead, we consider the factors that can help VCs attract
better managers and develop their networks, thus effec-
tively providing non-financial resources to their portfo-
lio EVs. Specifically, we focus on VC experience and
portfolio management strategy.
VCs strongly rely on their experience to effectively
coach their portfolio companies (Clarysse et al. 2013;
Sørensen 2007). Most reputed VCs may have access to
larger networks of suppliers, customers, and potential
managers (Hellmann and Puri 2002; Hochberg et al.
2007) and are thus in a position to contribute more to
the venture’s social capital. Moreover, the reputation of
experienced VCs may communicate unobserved quali-
ties about the company to the market (Megginson and
Weiss 1991; Pollock et al. 2010) and arguably boost the
company’s visibility in social networks and their ability
to hire skilled human resources. Along these lines, am-
ple empirical evidence shows that the experience and
reputation of VC managers has a positive influence on
the performance of target EVs in terms of initial public
offering (IPO) rates, IPO valuations, and efficiency
(e.g., Chemmanur et al. 2011; Nahata 2008; Sørensen
2007). Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis:
& Hypothesis 2.Only EVs backed by experienced VCs
grow more than PL-backed EVs.
The ability of VCs to add non-financial resources
also strongly depends on their portfolio management
strategy (Da Rin et al. 2013; Drover et al. 2017). The
effectiveness of VCs’ assistance on the performance of
investee firms increases with the effort and commitment
of VC managers (De Clercq and Fried 2005;
Jääskeläinen et al. 2006). The attention devoted by
VCs to each of their portfolio companies is likely to
influence the constructive coaching provided by VC
managers (Fulghieri and Sevilir 2009). One of the con-
structs used in the literature to analyze the extent to
which VCs are able to devote attention to portfolio
companies and to apply a “hands-on” approach is the
ratio between the number of portfolio EVs and the
number of venture managers overseeing them (Balboa
and Martí 2007; Cumming 2006). A high number of
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portfolio companies per VC manager tends to under-
mine the quality of advice (Bernile et al. 2007;
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg 2003) and, therefore, limits
the extent to which VCs provide non-financial resources
to their portfolio companies. Based on these arguments,
our third hypothesis is as follows:
& Hypothesis 3. Only EVs backed by VCs devoting
attention to their portfolio EVs grow more than PL-
backed EVs.
3 Methodological approach and data
3.1 Empirical approach
We isolate the effect of the provision of non-financial
resources by VCs from the effect of financial resources
by means of a DD estimator applied to the growth of
VC-backed and PL-backed EVs. The DD estimator is
computed as the difference in outcome for VC-backed
EVs around the VC injection year as compared with the
difference in the outcome of the PL-backed EVs around
the PL injection year (for recent applications to the VC
context, see Bernstein et al. 2016; Bronzini et al. 2019;
Dutta and Folta 2016).
In this study, the treatment of interest is having
received non-financial resources from VCs. VC-
backed EVs are the treated companies, and PL-backed
EVs are the non-treated ones. We analyze changes in
performance in EVs that obtain their first external fi-
nancing (either VC or PL). We compare changes before
and after the financing event for VC-backed (affected by
the treatment) and PL-backed (not affected by the treat-
ment) EVs. In the post-financing period, both PL-
backed and VC-backed EVs are expected to grow be-
cause of the financial resources received. However, we
expect the growth of VC-backed EVs to be higher than
that of PL-backed EVs because of the non-financial
resources added by VCs (Hypothesis 1).
3.2 Sample selection
Our sample is based on the Webcapitalriesgo database,
which includes information on the population of VC-
backed and PL-backed companies in Spain and is up-
dated every year. Since the 1990s, Webcapitalriesgo
actively collaborates with the Spanish Private Equity
and Venture Capital Association (ASCRI) to produce
the annual activity reports.
For VC-backed companies, the database contains
detailed information on the VCs involved, including
experience, sources of funds, number of portfolio firms,
and number of VC managers, which are not usually
available in secondary datasets. Regarding PLs, the
dataset includes companies that were awarded PLs by
either ENISA (a government-backed Spanish institu-
tion) or INVERTEC (a program implemented by
Catalonia’s regional government). The data on support-
ed companies were directly provided by both granting
institutions.
We used information on the population of compa-
nies, founded between 1996 and 2013, that received
either their first round of VC financing or their first PL
between 2005 and 2013. We focus on companies that
were 10 years old or younger at the time of the first VC
or PL funding. The population consists of 2552 EVs,
985 of which received VC and 1840 of which received
PLs. Of these companies, 273 received both VC and
PLs at some point in their lives. Specifically, 163 re-
ceived VC before PLs, 25 received PLs before VC, and
85 received PLs and VC in the same year. Hereafter, we
refer to VC-backed companies as the 960 companies
that received VC as their first external source of entre-
preneurial finance or that received VC and PL in the
same year. PL-backed EVs are, instead, the 1592 com-
panies that received PLs as their first source of entrepre-
neurial finance. The rationale behind this classification
is that companies backed by both PLs and VC received
both financial (VC and PLs) and non-financial (only
VC) resources from their investors and are therefore
similar to other VC-backed EVs.
Because of missing data in the variables of interest, in
this study, we do not use the full population described
above but rather a sample of 915 VC-backed and 1551
PL-backed EVs. The distribution of the subsample is not
significantly different from the distribution of the popu-
lation (Pearson χ2 (9) = 0.1922 for industries; Pearson
χ2 (16) = 0.8636 for regions). Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of VC-backed and PL-backed EVs effectively
used in the estimation process (i.e., 915 VC-backed and
1551 PL-backed EVs) across industries and regions.
The two distributions are significantly different (Pearson
χ2 (9) = 139.974, p value < 0.1 for industries; Pearson
χ2 (16) = 269.515, p value < 0.1 for regions). Within the
sample of VC-backed EVs, the most common activity
sectors are software, professional services, and R&D
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services. Within the sample of PL-backed EVs, we find
a stronger tendency to operate in trade services, profes-
sional services, other low-technology sectors, and soft-
ware. In terms of regions, both VC-backed and PL-
backed EVs are concentrated in Andalusia, Catalonia,
and the Madrid region, albeit in a different order.3
We build a company-year panel dataset to test our
hypotheses (Source: Orbis). We include up to 5 years of
observations before (“pre-funding” period) and up to
5 years of observations after (“post-funding” period)
funding. For companies that were financed when they
were younger than 5 years old, we have fewer observa-
tions in the pre-funding period. As our dataset covers up
to 2016, we have fewer than 5 observations in the post-
funding period for companies that were financed after
2011. Our results are similar if we use 3 years before
funding and 3 years after funding or if we impose that all
companies in the sample are observed for the same
number of years before and after funding.
3.3 Model specification
We test our hypotheses on the total assets, employment
and sales growth of EVs using a DD panel specification
with company fixed effects. Our basic model, excluding
control variables, is as follows:
Y i;t ¼ α0 þ α1 PostFini;t þ α2 VCbackedi
þ α3 PostFini;t VCbackedi þ ηi þ εi;t
We define three dependent variables (Yi,t),
lnTotalAssetst, lnEmployeest, and lnSalest, equal to the
logarithm of total assets, number of employees, and
gross sales of EVs, respectively, plus 1. PostFint is the
time dummy separating the pre-financing period from
the post-financing period: it changes from 0 to 1 in the
year in which a company receives the first round of
financing from either VCs or PLs. Its coefficient cap-
tures the differences in size (in other terms, growth)
around the financing event, i.e., the “first difference”
of the DD estimator. VCbacked is a time-invariant dum-
my equal to 1 for treated EVs, i.e., those that received
VC. Its coefficient would capture time-invariant differ-
3 Madrid and Catalonia concentrate the most populated and developed
cities, with access to banking and consultancy services. Andalusia is
the largest region in Spain, and very well connected with Madrid via
speed trains. It is not surprising that our results hold stronger in the
subset of sample EVs operating in such “cluster” regions (such results
are available from the authors upon request).
Table 1 Distribution of companies by first financing type re-
ceived, industry, and region
VC PL
Treatment N % N %
Distribution by industry
Manuf. of chemicals incl.
pharmaceuticals and materials
66 7.21 41 2.64
Manuf. of computers and
equipment
52 5.68 56 3.61
Other manufacturinga 76 8.31 107 6.90
Trade services 82 8.96 276 17.79
ICT services 53 5.79 134 8.64
Professional services 144 15.74 271 17.47
Software 151 16.50 265 17.09
R&D services 123 13.44 78 5.03
Other servicesb 55 6.01 55 3.55
Other low technology sectorsc 113 12.35 268 17.28
Total 915 100.00 1551 100.00
Distribution by region
Andalusia 209 22.84 154 9.93
Aragon 34 3.72 38 2.45
Asturias 45 4.92 34 2.19
Balearic Islands 6 0.66 21 1.35
Canary Islands 2 0.22 19 1.23
Cantabria 5 0.55 15 0.97
Castile-La Mancha 17 1.86 28 1.81
Castile and Leon 26 2.84 43 2.77
Catalonia 195 21.31 400 25.79
Valencia 43 4.70 103 6.64
Extremadura 45 4.92 20 1.29
Galicia 42 4.59 77 4.96
La Rioja 2 0.22 9 0.58
Madrid 121 13.22 460 29.66
Murcia 4 0.44 55 3.55
Navarra 35 3.83 21 1.35
Basque Country 84 9.18 54 3.48
Total 915 100.00 1551 100.00
This table includes the distribution of companies on which the
estimates are based
a Other manufacturing includes manufacturing of food products,
beverages, and tobacco products; manufacturing of textiles, appar-
el, leather, and related products; manufacturing of wood and paper
products; and printing
bOther services include transportation and storage, and accommo-
dation and food service activities
c Other low technology sectors include agriculture, forestry, fish-
ing, mining, and quarrying
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ences between VC- and PL-backed EVs. However, as
we use a fixed-effect specification, we do not actually
estimate the coefficient of VCbacked, and its effect is
captured by EVs’ fixed effects. The coefficient of
PostFini,t should capture the difference in size around
the financing event for PL-backed companies, i.e., the
effect of financial resources. The coefficient of the in-
teraction between PostFini,t and VCbackedi captures
how much the differences in size for VC-backed EVs
around the financing event were larger (or smaller) than
those for PL-backed EVs, i.e., the DD estimator. Ac-
cording to Hypothesis 1, the coefficient of the interac-
tion between PostFini,t and VCbackedi, which measures
the effect of the non-financial resources added by VCs
on the performance of EVs, should be positive and
significant.
We include EV fixed effects (ηi). This approach
is preferred to random-effect estimators when the
treatment is not randomly assigned, and some in-
dividuals are more likely to be treated than others
based on some time-invariant characteristics
(Besley and Case 2000). For instance, VC-backed
EVs may be systematically different from PL-
backed EVs due to their inner quality or the
long-term prospects of their businesses. The EV
fixed-effect terms should capture such differences.
A Hausman test confirmed that the fixed-effect
estimator is more desirable than a random-effect
estimator in our setting (χ2 (21) = 610.72 for em-
ployment growth, χ2 (21) = 2321.90 for total assets
growth, and χ2 (21) = 205.28 for sales growth, all
with p value < 1%). We also cluster standard er-
rors at the company level to correct for both
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Bertrand
et al. 2004).
In each model, we control for company age in loga-
rithms (lnAget); liquidity, measured as the logarithm of
cash and cash equivalents, lagged (lnCasht-1); intangi-
bles, measured by the ratio of intangibles to total assets,
lagged (Intangiblest-1); and year dummies. Moreover, to
better capture the effect of the injection of financial
resources, in the regressions, we also include lnAmountt,
i.e., the cumulated amount of funding received from
VCs or in the form of PLs until year t by the focal
company (the results are similar if we control for the
non-cumulative amounts injected in each year). The
amounts are expressed in terms of the logarithms of
EUR received.
Table 2 summarizes the definition of all variables of
interest and provides summary statistics for the entire
sample. The correlation matrix is shown in Table 3.
In addition, we study two drivers of the ability of
VCs to add non-financial resources: experience (Hy-
pothesis 2) and portfolio management strategy (Hypoth-
esis 3). To do so, we classify all VCs into two exclusive
categories for each driver.
As suggested by Sørensen (2007), we measure
experience (Hypothesis 2) with the number of
successfully exited investments (i.e., divestments
via trade sale or initial public offering) carried
out by each VCs in the previous 5 years. The
dummy variable ExperiencedVC is equal to 1 if
the EV was funded by a VC that, at the time of
the investment, belonged to the group of most
experienced investors, i.e., those with the highest
number of successful divestments made in the
previous 5 years. As thresholds, we consider the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the distribution
of the number of successful divestments. The dum-
my InexperiencedVC is equal to 1 for EVs backed
by VCs that did not belong to the experienced
group at the time of the investment (i.e., VCbaked
− ExperiencedVC). To test our hypothesis on port-
folio management strategy (Hypothesis 3), we con-
sider the number of portfolio EVs per investment
manager for each VC, which indicates how much
attention VC managers can dedicate to each of
their portfolio EVs. The dummy AttentiveVC is
equal to 1 for EVs receiving VC from investors
belonging to the group showing the lowest values
for the ratio of the number of EVs per investment
manager (we also computed the results for differ-
ent thresholds), whereas the dummy UnattentiveVC
is equal to 1 for EVs receiving funding from the
remaining VCs (i.e., VCbacked − AttentiveVC).
For each dimension, we substitute the variable
VCbacked in our baseline model with the set of two
dummy variables identifying the EVs backed by VCs in
each category (e.g., for experience, we use
ExperiencedVC and InexperiencedVC). The interactions
between PostFint and each of the two dummies corre-
spond to the DD estimators capturing the effect of the
non-financial resources provided by each category of
investors. For each driver, we expect only one of the two
groups of VCs to have a significant effect (i.e., the most
experienced and the most “attentive”).
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3.4 Descriptive statistics and the parallel trend
assumption
In Table 4, we show statistics of the variables of
interest for the two groups of EVs in the year of their
first financing. The number of employees, total as-
sets, sales, and the availability of cash were not
significantly different for VC-backed and PL-
backed EVs 1 year before funding. Table 4 also
reports statistically (but not economically) significant
differences in age (VC-backed EVs were only half a
year younger) and in the ratio of intangibles to total
assets (0.22 versus 0.2). However, we find significant
differences in the amount of funding received, as the
average “ticket” received by VC-backed EVs was 5
times greater than that of PL-backed ones.
However, the DD approach does not specifically
require treated and untreated companies to be similar
by the time of the treatment. A rather crucial premise of
the DD methodology is the so-called parallel trends
assumption, which requires that, before the treatment,
both groups exhibit the same slope (trend) along the
Table 2 Summary statistics and variable definitions
Variable Description Mean SD Median Min Max Number
lnAget Logarithm of years of age 1.521 0.496 1.609 0.693 2.773 10,990
Aget Years of age 4.2 2.6 4.0 1.0 15.0
lnCasht-1 Logarithm of cash available plus 1, lagged by 1 year 10.820 2.542 11.059 0.000 17.828 10,990
Casht-1 Cash available, lagged by 1 year (k€) 429.2 1652.3 63.5 0.0 55,277.0
Intangiblest-1 Percentage of intangible assets on total assets, lagged by 1 year 0.203 0.248 0.079 0.000 1.000 10,990
lnEmployeest Logarithm of the number of employees, plus 1 1.938 1.172 1.792 0.000 6.966 10,822
Employeest Number of employees 14.8 37.2 5.0 0.0 1059.0
lnTotalAssetst Logarithm of total assets, plus 1 13.498 1.967 13.557 0.000 19.587 10,990
TotalAssetst Total assets (k€) 3796.8 13,520.4 772.4 0.0 321,118.1
lnSalest Logarithm of gross sales, plus 1 12.046 3.196 12.512 0.000 19.912 10,852
Salest Gross sales (k€) 2070.5 10,877.4 271.7 0.0 444,364.0
PostFint Dummy that turns from 0 to 1 in the year in which a company
receives its first round of VC or PL
0.804 0.397 1.000 0.000 1.000 10,990
lnAmountt Logarithm of the cumulated amount of funding received in year t
from VC or PL
12.947 10.717 11.513 0.000 84.439 10,943
Amountt Cumulated amount of funding received in year t from VC or PL
(k€)
594.3 3141.2 100.0 0.0 169,226.0
VCbacked Dummy equal to 1 for VC-backed companies 0.403 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 10,990
Original values (not transformed into logarithms) in smaller font size. It should be in “italics”. Source: Orbis and Webcapitalriesgo
Table 3 Pairwise correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 lnAget 1.000
2 lnCasht-1 0.241 1.000
3 Intangiblest-1 0.086 − 0.083 1.000
4 lnEmployeest 0.381 0.454 − 0.019 1.000
5 lnTotalAssetst 0.372 0.543 0.049 0.657 1.000
6 lnSalest 0.344 0.296 − 0.101 0.636 0.512 1.000
7 PostFint 0.133 0.122 0.074 0.004 0.027 − 0.017 1.000
8 lnAmountt-1 0.235 0.276 0.153 0.229 0.287 0.107 0.595 1.000
9 VCbacked − 0.018 0.096 0.043 0.047 0.170 0.000 0.094 0.320 1.000
The correlation matrix is based on 138,952 observations. Variables are defined in Table 2. Italic values are significant at the 99% level
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performance measure under investigation (Roberts and
Whited 2013). To test this assumption, we study the
growth patterns of VC-backed and PL-backed EVs in
the years before and after receiving external financing.
Figure 1 shows the trends in the average number of
employees, sales and total assets (in logs) in the 5 years
before and 5 years after the first funding event for VC-
backed and PL-backed EVs. To build the graph, we
considered only companies for which we have account-
ing information in all the years considered to use a
consistent sample to compute averages. The figure
shows that the trends of the outcome variables were
parallel across groups before the funding event (i.e.,
before year 0) and suggest that the DD approach is
suitable for our data.4 The graphs also show that, in this
sample, VC-backed EVs tend to be smaller than PL-
backed EVs before financing, but the differences de-
crease in the following years, consistent with higher
growth rates for the VC-backed EVs after treatment.
4 Results
4.1 Financial and non-financial value added
In Table 5, we show the impact of our independent
variables and controls on EV employment, total assets,
and sales growth. For each dependent variable, we show
three specifications: a model including only standard
control variables (columns I–III), a model in which we
include our independent variables (columns IV–VI),
and a full-fledged model (columns VII–IX) in which
we also control for the financial resources received thus
far (lnAmountt).
In columns I–III, the control variable models show
that older companies with more cash have a higher
number of employees, assets, and sales, while compa-
nies with more intangible assets have lower employ-
ment levels and higher assets and sales. Such results
are similar to those in other model specifications. In
columns IV-VI, the coefficient of PostFint is significant
at the 1% for employment and total assets. The coeffi-
cients are, respectively, equal to 0.109 and 0.203, cor-
responding to increases of 11.52% (exp(0.109) − 1) in
Table 4 Descriptive statistics by group in the year of the funding
VC PL Difference Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum
(Mann-Whitney) test
Aget Mean 1.73 2.21 0.48 4.159***
Std. dev. 0.06 0.06
Cash in t − 1 (k€) Mean 218.58 192.41 − 26.18 1.355
Std. dev. 36.55 24.86
Intangibles on total assets in t − 1 (%) Mean 0.22 0.20 − 0.02 − 2.6***
Std. dev. − 0.26 − 0.25
Number of employees in t − 1 Mean 4.92 7.47 2.55 1.559
Std. dev. 0.64 0.71
Total assets in t − 1 (k€) Mean 1485.87 1434.70 − 51.18 0.916
Std. dev. 316.71 183.80
Sales in t − 1 (k€) Mean 511.14 900.02 388.89 0.352
Std. dev. 115.67 125.97
Amount invested (k€) Mean 711.87 137.70 − 574.17 − 20.129***
Std. dev. 50.55 4.16
*p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%
4 In addition, we also test the equivalence of trends for the full sample
by computing the percentage change of sales, total assets and employ-
ment during the 5 years before the funding event, finding that on
average such percentage change is not significantly different for VC-
backed and PL-backed companies. As an alternative approach, we
replicated our main analysis on sales, total assets and employment
growth, but restricted the sample to the pre-financing observation
period only. Besides control variables and company fixed effects, we
included a variable counting the years since the founding and the
interaction between such variable and a dummy identifying VC-
backed companies. Interestingly, such interaction is not significant,
suggesting that VC-backed companies did not have a different trend in
growth rates than PL-backed companies before the financing. Such
results are available from the authors upon request.
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employment and 22.51% (exp(0.203) − 1) in total as-
sets. The interaction between PostFint and VCbacked
captures the difference in the increase in performance
between VC-backed and PL-backed EVs (i.e., the DD
estimator). The coefficient of the interaction is positive
and significant along the three dimensions, at least at the
5% confidence level. Compared with PL-backed EVs,
VC-backed EVs grew more in terms of employment
(exp(0.170) − 1, i.e., 18.53%), total assets (exp(0.387)
− 1, i.e., 47.26%), and sales (exp(0.484) − 1, i.e.,
62.26%) after the first financing event. The results sug-
gest that VC boosts the growth of target companies
more than PLs, arguably because of the non-financial
resources received, which supports Hypothesis 1. In
terms of magnitude, the effect of the non-financial re-
sources added by VCs on growth goes well beyond that
of the financial resources provided by both VCs and PLs
along all growth dimensions.
In columns VII–IX, we replicate the analysis by con-
trolling for the amount of financial resources injected.
lnAmountt has positive and significant coefficients along
all growth dimensions, with a p value < 1% for employ-
ment and total assets and p value < 10% for sales, sug-
gesting that the injection of financial resources allows
companies to hire more employees, invest more in assets,
and, ultimately, register higher sales. Interestingly, the
coefficient of PostFint loses significance in these models,
consistent with the fact that the effect of the financial
resources added by VCs or PLs is captured by the amount
injected. On the other hand, the coefficient of
PostFint*VCbacked remains sizable and significant (at
the 10%, 1%, and 5% level, respectively, for growth in
employment, assets, and sales). In terms of magnitude, we
find similar results to those reported in columns IV–VI:
12.86% (exp(0.121) − 1) increase in employment, 38.13%
(exp(0.323) − 1) increase in total assets, and 54.03%
(exp(0.432) − 1) increase in sales.
We can compare these results, which are especially
important in the case of total assets and sales,5 with the
5 These high-growth rates are not rare in the case of recently-
established SMEs.
Fig. 1 Trends in average total assets, employment, and sales of
VC-backed and PL-backed companies, from 5 years before fi-
nancing to 5 years after financing. The graph shows the average
level of total assets, employment, and sales (in logarithms) in the
10 years around the first investment (t = 0). It is based on all VC-
backed and PL-backed companies in the population, for which
accounting data was available at least from 5 years before the
treatment till 5 years after
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impact of financial resources, represented by the coeffi-
cient of lnAmountt. The non-financial value added in-
creases sales by 54.03 percentage points, while the
financial value added is 1.31% (exp(0.013) − 1) for each
unit of the variable lnAmountt. As the average value for
such variable is equal to 12.947 (see Table 2), we
estimate an average effect of 16.94 (1.31%× 12.947)
percentage points in the model for sales. In other words,
on average, the increase due to the non-financial value
added is 3 times that of the financial value added.
Similarly, non-financial and financial value added in-
creases total assets by 38.13 and 20.88 ((exp(0.016) −
1) × 12.947)) percentage points, respectively. For em-
ployment, the effects of the non-financial and financial
resources added by VCs are similar: 12.86 and 13.01
((exp(0.010) − 1) × 12.947) percentage points,
respectively.
4.2 VC firms’ heterogeneity and the provision
of non-financial resources
In Table 6, we show the results concerning our hypothe-
ses relating to the drivers of the ability of VCs to provide
non-financial resources: experience (Hypothesis 2) and
portfolio management strategy (Hypothesis 3).
In panel A, we report the results on experience, mea-
sured by the sum of the number of successful divestments
(i.e., exits via trade sale or initial public offering) complet-
ed in the previous 5 years. We provide different thresholds
to classify VCs as experienced (i.e., the dummy
ExperiencedVC = 1), ranging from above the first quartile
VCs (i.e., including 75% of VCs, in columns I–III), the
second quartile VCs (i.e., including the top 50% VCs, in
columns IV–VI), and the third quartile VCs (i.e., including
the top 25% VCs, in columns VII–IX) of the sum of
successful divestments. The interaction between PostFint
and ExperiencedVC is positive and significant in all
models, while the interaction between PostFint and
InexperiencedVC is only significant for employment
growth in the least demanding threshold and for total assets
growth in the second quartile threshold. Interestingly, the
coefficients for the top 25% experienced VCs are greater
than those reported in Table 5 for all VCs.According to the
results in columns VII–IX, the non-financial value added
increases employment by 22.51 (exp(0.203) − 1) percent-
age points (versus 12.86 for all VCs), total assets by 58.72
(exp(0.462) − 1, versus 38.13 for all VCs) percentage
points, and sales by 138.45 percentage points (exp(0.869)
− 1, versus 54.03 for all VCs). Hence, we find that the
most experienced VCs have a stronger effect on EVs’
growth, firmly supporting Hypothesis 2.
In panel B, we consider the effect of VC portfolio
management strategy, captured by the ratio between the
number of portfolio EVs and the number of investment
managers of each VCs.We also defined three thresholds
for attention (i.e., the dummy AttentiveVC = 1), with the
most demanding one being the ratio having a value
below the first quartile, shown in columns I–III. The
second threshold defined a VCs as attentive if the ratio
was below the median. The results are shown in col-
umns IV–VI. Finally, the results on the least demanding
threshold, which are reported in columns VII–IX, in-
clude VCs with a ratio below the last quartile (i.e., 75%
of VCs). The interaction between PostFint and
AttentiveVC is not significant in any of the three models
when attention is defined by a ratio of portfolio EVs per
VC investment manager below the first quartile (col-
umns I–III). It only has positive and significant coeffi-
cients in the model on total assets growth for VCs with a
ratio below the median, or in the models on employment
and total assets growth for VCs with a ratio below the
third quartile. In these latter cases, we do not find
significant interactions for UnattentiveVC. This finding
provides very limited support for Hypothesis 3.
In sum, we find that the non-financial value added by
VCs is driven by those with broader experience, but not
necessarily by those with a small number of portfolio
EVs monitored by each investment manager.
4.3 Robustness checks
The key assumption for the consistency of the DD estima-
tor is that the average change in the outcome variable
would have been the same for treated and untreated EVs
if they both received the treatment. We ensured this by
verifying the parallel trends assumption and by choosing
fixed-effect specifications that capture time-invariant dif-
ferences in the characteristics of treated and untreated EVs.
Even though VC-backed EVs were similar to PL-backed
EVs at the time of the first financing, we follow the
suggestion by Roberts and Whited (2013) to apply the
DD approach to a sample of more homogeneous treated
and untreated EVs, selected with a matching algorithm.
Further, some studies argue that the DD methodology in
combination with matching “…improves the quality of
non-experimental evaluation results significantly”
(Blundell and Costa Dias 2000, p. 438; see also Abadie
2005). Therefore, as a robustness check, for the treated
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VC-backed companies, we selected a counterfactual of
matched PL-backed EVs, using two alternative matching
algorithms. First, we performed company-level 1:1 pro-
pensity score matching (PSM) in the year before the first
funding. To compute the propensity score (i.e., the proba-
bility of being VC-backed rather than PL-backed), we
selected slightly different matching variables for each
growth measure. In all three models, we used lnAget,
industry, region and year dummies as matching variables.
In addition, in the model for employee growth, we also
used lnEmployeest and the logarithmic growth of em-
ployees (lnEmployeest− lnEmployeest-1); in the model for
total assets growth, we used lnTotalAssetst and the loga-
rithmic growth of total assets (lnTotalAssetst −
lnTotalAssetst-1); and in the model for sales growth, we
included lnSalest and the logarithmic growth of sales
(lnSalest − lnSalest-1). We then picked the closest (i.e.,
nearest neighbor) PL-backed EV for each VC-backed
EV based on the propensity score. Second, we applied
coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. 2012) in the
year before the financing event. In contrast to PSM, CEM
allows for the ex-ante control of the balancing of the
matched sample. As matching variables, we used the
age, NACE industry code (4 digits), region, and founda-
tion year of the EVs. CEM identifies the strata of all the
combinations of the coarsened continuous and the categor-
ical matching variables and eliminates all treated and un-
treated EVs that do not share common characteristics with
EVs in the other group 1 year before the first financing.
Once the matched samples were selected with either PSM
or CEM, we replicated our main analysis. The results are
shown in columns I–III (PSM) and IV–VI (CEM) of
Table 7 and are robust to our previous estimates.
Another challenge to the validity of the DD methodol-
ogy is that the treatment may be endogenous. VC is
provided after careful screening of companies’ business
plans, which is probably based on unobservable time-
varying characteristics, such as the potential to develop
innovative products that will soon be market-ready. PLs
are also granted after a detailed screening process. Never-
theless, the two selection processes can be different be-
cause of the different nature and objectives of the institu-
tions carrying out the processes (VCs versus a public body
for PLs). If some companies have unobservable time-
varying characteristics that make them simultaneously
more likely to obtain VC (rather than PL) and achieve
high growth if financial resources are injected, then the
treatment is endogenous, and we may have overestimated
its effect on company growth.
Researchers often include the lagged dependent vari-
able in the regressors of the DD specification to reduce
endogeneity concerns (Bertrand et al. 2004). Besley and
Case (2000) encourage the use of an instrumental variable
approach when the DD framework could be potentially
weakened by treatment endogeneity. We embrace both
approaches and resort to a dynamic panel model, with an
AR(1) component and exogenous instruments: the
difference-generalized method of moments approach
(Arellano and Bond 1991). Specifically, we consider the
lagged dependent variable as predetermined and
lnAmountt-1, PostFint and its interaction with VCbacked
as endogenous. We use the first differences of the
predetermined variables from t − 1 and of the
Intangiblest-1, lnCasht-1 and the endogenous variables
from t − 2 as moment conditions. As strictly exogenous
instruments , we include year dummies and
VCfundraisingonGDPinRegiont-1, defined as the amount
of funds raised by VCs in each Spanish region (source:
Webcapitalriesgo), divided by the GDP in that region
(source: Eurostat) and lagged by 1 year. Following Brand-
er et al. (2015), we believe that this variable captures
exogenous variations in the likelihood that a company will
receive VC (rather than PLs). We use the robust two-step
covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005). The
results of these models are reported in columns VII–IX of
Table 7. The Arellano-Bond tests for AR(1) and AR(2)
confirm that using the second lag of the differences in the
variables as an instrument is a valid approach. Additional-
ly, the Hansen test confirms that the instruments are exog-
enous. Our results relating to the variable of interest,
PostFint × VCbacked, are robust in this model specifica-
tion, showing even larger coefficients for employment and
sales growth.6
We conducted several other robustness checks. First, as
a last check on the endogeneity of the treatment, we
repeated our analysis based on the sample of 273 compa-
nies that received both VC and PLs. We used EVs that
received VC before PLs or at the same time, as the treated
group, and EVs that received PLs before receiving VC as
the counterfactual. As all these companies went through
the selection of both VC and PLs, endogeneity issues are
virtually nonexistent in this sample. Second, we used
random-effects estimation rather than fixed-effect estima-
tion. Third, we restricted the sample to companies that are
6 We have also repeated the model on total assets excluding lnCasht-1
to control for the potential redundancy of this variable with the lagged
dependent variable. The results do not change.
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younger than 5 years by the time of the first financing.
Fourth, we changed the observation window to 3 (rather
than 5) years of observations before and after funding.
Fifth, we excluded companies for which we have any gaps
in the accounting information during the observation win-
dow (as recommended by Besley and Case 2000), and we
resorted to a cross section rather than panel specification to
reduce concerns of serial correlation (Bertrand et al. 2004).
Finally, we also repeated our estimates excluding all EVs
(273) that received both VC and PLs. Our results, which
are discussed in more detail in the available online (Tables
A1-A4), are largely robust to all of these changes.
5 Discussion and conclusions
VC investors have attracted substantial academic interest
for their unique ability to “add value” to portfolio compa-
nies beyond the injection of financial resources. The first
contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical frame-
work for explaining how VCs can add value to their
portfolio EVs. In the resource-based view of the firm, the
competitive advantage of EVs is driven by three categories
of unique resources: financial, human capital, and social
capital (Ireland et al. 2003). VCs could improve the com-
petitive advantage of their portfolio companies both indi-
rectly, by injecting financial resources that can be used by
EVs to improve their human and social capital, and direct-
ly, by granting EVs access to non-financial resources that
they could not otherwise acquire, such as a network of
contacts, mentoring, and coaching.
Disentangling the impact of the financial and non-
financial resources added by VCs on EV performance is
a difficult empirical issue but still fundamental to justifying
the reputation of VCs as prominent financers of EVs. Our
second contribution is the design of a methodology that
allows us to estimate the magnitude of the effect of the VC
provision of non-financial resources. For our sample of
VC-backed EVs, we use a counterfactual of companies
that received a similar form of external financial resources
(namely, PLs) from institutions that do not provide non-
financial resources. We find that both VC-backed and PL-
backed companies grew after the financing event, arguably
because those resources were used to acquire key non-
financial resources that contributed to improving the com-
petitive advantage of the EVs. Moreover, our DD estima-
tor indicates that VC-backed EVs grew more than PL-
backed EVs after the first financing, in terms of employ-
ment (12.96%), total assets (38.13%), and sales (54.03%),
arguably due to the addition of non-financial resources.
We also quantify the growth attributable to the financial
resources received by all funded EVs on average, which is
similar in the employment growth model (13.01%), but
lower in terms of total assets (20.88%) and, especially,
sales growth (16.94%). We explain the higher growth of
VC-backed EVs by the unique non-financial contribution
of VCs.
Our results depend on the critical assumption that the
effect of the financial resources added by VCs and PLs are
similar. For this condition to be met, the VC-backed and
PL-backed EVs in our sample should have similar observ-
able and unobservable characteristics, implying that VCs
and the institution providing PLs should have similar
selection criteria, which is possibly not the case. For in-
stance, they may have different risk profiles or different
abilities to assess the market potential of EVs. Although
our results may be influenced by differences in the selec-
tion criteria of VCs and PLs (and this is an inherent
limitation of this study), our set of robustness checks
confirms that they are not solely driven by such
differences.
Another stated assumption of this paper is that, contrary
to VC, PLs do not entail any non-financial resources.
However, the institution granting PLs usually requires
the beneficiary company to complete a simultaneous cap-
ital increase, which could sometimes be provided by other
external investors that add non-financial resources, such as
business angels. While we carefully control for the addi-
tional financial resources injected in the form of PLs, we
have no information on which companies received busi-
ness angel investments. Nevertheless, our results point to
the fact thatVCs provide non-financial resources, the effect
of which on growth goes beyond that of the non-financial
resources added by other external investors, such as busi-
ness angels, and reassure us of the validity of our claims.
All in all, our results firmly endorse the ability of VC to
add value and provide non-financial resources that EVs
cannot otherwise acquire (i.e., resources that “money can-
not buy”).
Our third contribution concerns the analysis of the
drivers of the ability of VCs to add non-financial resources.
The literature on VC heterogeneity is extremely devel-
oped, although highly fragmented (see Da Rin et al.
2013, for a review). We contribute to this literature by
considering two characteristics of VCs, namely, their ex-
perience and portfolio management strategy, which argu-
ably determine their ability to add human and social capital
to their investee EVs.We find that onlyVC firms that have
A. Quas et al.
broad experience are able to contribute to the growth of
EVs. Conversely, we do not find the same support for the
degree of attention devoted by VCs to their portfolio EVs.
It seems that the quality of the coaching and monitoring
function largely exceeds the abundance of managers over-
seeing portfolio EVs. Hence, we complement the literature
on the key importance of VCs’ experience (Clarysse et al.
2013) and portfolio management strategy (Balboa and
Martí 2007; Cumming 2006) by documenting to what
extent these characteristics influence the ability of VCs to
add non-financial resources and not only their capacity to
select better companies (Sørensen 2007).
Our results have important implications for practi-
tioners. For VCs, attaining a critical mass in terms of
experience is a necessary condition for ensuring the growth
of portfolio companies, which ultimately leads to invest-
ment success. Entrepreneurs should also be aware that not
all VCs are similar in their non-financial contribution: VCs
experience is a crucial important factor to consider when
selecting themost appropriateVCs to approach. This paper
also justifies the efforts of policy makers in supporting the
VC industry, as we show that VCs are unique in their
ability to add non-financial resources in addition tomoney.
Our study has some limitations that open the way to
future research. First, our analysis is limited to the Spanish
context. Spain presents a relatively well-developed VC
market (the fourth largest in terms of the amount invested)
in Europe (Invest Europe 2016) and is therefore an inter-
esting test bed for our hypotheses. However, a replication
of this study on a larger international databasewould ensure
the generalizability of our results. For this purpose, other
instruments that are similar to VC in terms of funding
effects, but do not add any non-financial resources, should
be used as the counterfactual. Injections of preferred shares
after careful selection and without any post-investment
monitoring are an ideal candidate for such analysis. Second,
we lack direct measures of the human and social capital of
VC firms, such as the education and working experience of
their manager or their position in the VC networks (e.g.,
Hochberg et al. 2007; Zarutskie 2010). Such measures
would allow a more explicit test of the drivers of the ability
of VCs to contribute to the human and social capital of their
portfolio EVs. Third, along the same lines, information on
the human and social capital of target companies and their
evolution before and after the receipt of VC investments
could allow for studying how VCs influence the financial
and non-financial resources of their ventures (Ko and
Mckelvie 2018) and, in turn, how these resources lead to
higher growth. Fourth, it would be interesting to apply our
approach to examine whether the effectiveness of the non-
financial resources added by VCs depends on the idiosyn-
cratic characteristics of EVs. For instance, a venture’s ab-
sorptive capacity, i.e., its ability to access and internalize
externally generated knowledge (Zahra and George 2002),
may positively moderate the extent to which the non-
financial resources added by VCs can trigger growth.
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